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Abstract 
 
Unlike in other disciplines, research output in economics is commonly measured based on the 
journal titles in which an author has published. Here, I examine how much output measures 
based on journal titles tell us about the academic interest and relevance of economic papers as 
measured by citation frequency. Using data from the 2008 Handelsblatt ranking of 
economists in German speaking countries and interdisciplinary citation data from the Web of 
Science, I find that researcher scores based on journal titles explain only about one fourth of 
the variation (variance) in article citations. When the top 10 (20) percent of the researchers 
according to journal title scores are excluded, the percentage of explained variation in citation 
frequency drops to 5 (3) percent. These findings empirically confirm the hypothesis that the 
measures of research output in economics promote narrow and complacent work that is of 
interest to few, even among an academic audience. They suggest that responsible hiring 
committees and funding institutions should re-examine existing standards in evaluation and 
abandon the heavy reliance on journal titles as a measure of individual research output. 
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1. Introduction 
 
For good reasons, the use of citation frequency as a sole or main criterion for measuring 
researcher productivity is being increasingly criticised (e.g. Adler et al. 2008). Key issues 
with citation based output measures include their limited responsiveness to an article’s 
interest and relevance outside academia and the problem that these measures can provide 
incentives for unproductive herd behaviour and “citation cartels” in research. Furthermore, it 
is often argued that the coverage of sources by the existing citation databases is not 
sufficiently objective or comprehensive. 
Less widely appreciated is the idea that the incentives in research can be even worse 
where research output is not measured based on article citations but instead relies on a mono-
disciplinary expert rating of the journals in which an author has published. Such is the 
situation in economics where a small number of authoritative individuals define “quality” 
through a largely subjective weighting of journal titles and at the same time act as gate 
keepers who select the articles published in those same journals (Laband and Tollison 2003, 
Oswald 2007). In this system, the quality of an individual article is defined solely, and for all 
eternity, by the journal title in which it has been accepted for publication—regardless of 
whether the article is ever read, understood or cited by any audience.  
In the economic discipline, universities and funding agencies largely base their hiring 
and funding decisions on this quality criterion. This is not a contentious claim but would be 
confirmed by almost any academic working in the discipline. Anecdotal evidence from job 
and funding applications and personal communications from many of colleagues support the 
impression that the use of journal titles is the central criterion in research evaluations. 
Since citations, in contrast, play virtually no role in the evaluation of economic 
research output, any rational economist who wishes to survive and succeed in academia 
should focus on chasing journal titles – and sacrifice the objectives of relevance and interest 
(as measured by future citations) in his or her research. This implies the testable hypothesis 
that economists’ research output based on journal titles should, as a result, be only very 
weakly, if at all, associated with their output based on citations. If this hypothesis is 
confirmed, this finding would imply that the incentives introduced by these output measures 
do not encourage interesting and widely relevant work. Originating from a time when this 
problem was not apparent (and citation data were unavailable), these output measures would 
thus be highly undesirable from a societal and efficiency perspective.  
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Here, I examine this hypothesis empirically. Specifically, I investigate the relationship 
between a well known traditional measure of researcher output based on expert-rated journal 
titles – the Handelsblatt-Ranking of economists in German speaking countries‡ – with the 
same authors’ citation rates in Web-of-Science-listed journals. The following specific 
questions are addressed: 
 (1) How much of the variation in researchers’ number of citations is explained by their 
score based on journal titles? 
 (2) How strong is the association between researcher rank based on citations and 
researcher rank based on journal scores? 
 We find that these relationships are very weak, confirming the hypothesis that the 
traditional measurement of research output in economics produces problematic incentives and 
should for this reason be abandoned by universities and funding institutions as a sole or major 
indicator of research quality. 
The remainder of the paper is organized as follows. The next section introduces the 
relevant journal weighting schemes and discusses the incentives for research that may result 
from these measures. Section 3 presents the data used in the empirical analysis. Section 4 
contains the results, followed by conclusions. 
 
 
2. Journal weighting schemes and resulting incentives 
 
In economics, a variety of journal weighting schemes have been proposed (see e.g. Kodrzycki 
and Yu 2006). In Europe, the two most established weighting schemes are probably the 
‘Tinbergen list’ and the weighting scheme developed by Combes and Linnemer (2003). Each 
of these is based on a subjective weighting of journals by selected experts. To provide a 
flavour of the considerations that went into these schemes, and to document their limited 
scope, these two schemes are in the following described in the words of the authors. 
The Tinbergen list classifies journals as “generally accepted top-level journals” (AA), 
“very good journals covering economics in general and the top journals in each field” (A), 
and “good journals for all research fields within the Tinbergen Institute”. The fields covered 
by the Tinbergen Institute cover “economics, econometrics, finance, operations research, 
                                                 
‡ Starting in 2010, the Handelsblatt-Ranking will be jointly published by the Newspaper Handelsblatt, the 
German Verein für Socialpolitik and the Konjunkturforschungsstelle (KOF) of the Federal Institute of 
Technology ETH, Switzerland. The ranking will thus be officially endorsed by an academic association and a 
public research institution. 
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marketing and accounting”. On its website, which also displays the resulting journal weights, 
the Tinbergen Institute describes the classification as follows:§ 
The classification is based on objective rankings, supported by the judgement of experts. Important inputs have 
been: SSCI and SCI impact factors, the ranking by Kalaitzidakis, P. et al.. 2003. "Ranking of Academic Journals 
and Institutions in Economics", Journal of the European Economic Association: 1 (6), pp. 1346-66, and a more 
recent 'within economics' ranking by Kodrzycki, Y. and P. Yu (2006) "New Approaches to Ranking Economics 
Journals," Contributions to Economic Analysis & Policy: Vol. 5: Iss. 1, Article 24. 
The weighting scheme by Combes and Linnemer (2003), was developed for the European 
Economic Association (EEA) for a ranking of the leading European economics departments. 
The weighting is described as follows (Combes and Linnemer 2003, p. 4): 
 
We built an original journal weighting scheme denoted CL that weights all EconLit journals from 1 to 1/12. 
After a long and repetitive procedure which started in 1998 [...] we divided the EconLit journals in six groups. 
First, top journals are significantly differentiated from other ones with a weight equal to 1. A weight of 8/12 only 
is given to the next 16 journals. Then, a series of 39 journals are weighted 6/12, 68 journals 4/12, 138 journals 
2/12 and all remaining journals 1/12 [...]. 
Our choices, which could be discussed endlessly as more than 800 journals are considered, tried to be 
consistent with citation/impact indicators when they are available. We do not think, however, that these have to 
be followed blindly. Independently of the journal average quality, the number of citations can vary from one 
field to the other and from a young journal to an older one. To counter this kind of effects, in any case, we tried 
to put at least 6/12 to any journal which is a leader in its field. Conversely, we did not put 8/12 or more to a 
journal too specialized. We do not believe that our scheme is perfect but the centre rankings proved to be very 
robust to moderate changes in weights even if such changes could be important at the individual level. 
 
As suggested earlier, measures based on expert-rated journal titles are not only a highly noisy 
signal of quality but may also provide a number of problematic incentives in publication 
beyond those of typically criticized with citation based measures. At least four potentially 
problematic incentives can be identified (Table 1). 
First, journal ratings may be a very noisy signal of the quality of individual articles. 
Previous research has demonstrated a substantial overlap of article citation rates among 
journals with higher and lower reputation (Laband and Tollison 2003, Starbuck 1005, Oswald 
2007). Measurement based on journal titles thus provides a strong incentive for wasteful 
investments in repeated submissions to top journals with high rejection rates. 
Second, it is well known that papers can be purposefully written to please the editors 
and reviewers of the journal to which they are submitted. Articles are more likely to be 
                                                 
§ http://www.tinbergen.nl/research-institute/journal-classification.php (accessed 18 November, 2009). 
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accepted in highly ranked economics journals if they support (and slightly extend) rather than 
contradict received wisdom (Frey 2003). Hence, research evaluation based on journal titles 
may discourage innovative and challenging work that may, for this very reason, be 
disadvantaged in highly ranked journals (but would nevertheless be successful in term of 
future citations if published in a ‘lower’ journal). 
Third, the journal ratings, and hence evaluations based on them, reward and thus 
promote technicality and (unwarranted) mathematical sophistication, as many economists use 
and perceive these to as signals of high-quality research.** This is directly reflected in the 
weighting schemes. For instance, the journal Ecological Economics places little emphasis on 
technicality and disciplinary sophistication. Although it ranks among the top economics 
journals in terms of its Web-of-Science impact factor, it receives the lowest possible score in 
major disciplinary rankings (including the Handelsblatt ranking described below). 
 Finally, since articles published in journals of related disciplines are not ‘counted’, the 
economic output measures provide powerful and virtually irresistible incentives for a purely 
disciplinary orientation in publishing. (As a matter of fact, the authors of some economic 
weighting schemes seem to have quite willingly cultivated a narrow disciplinary 
orientation.††) 
In sum, output measures based on journal titles have the potential to provide incentives 
for economic research that is technically sophisticated, supportive of prior work and close to 
the core of the discipline – at a possible expense of relevance, interest, originality and 
innovation. 
 
 
3. Data and measures 
 
3.1 Output measure based on journal titles 
 
On 22 September 2008, the German newspaper Handelsblatt published the 2008 edition of its 
ranking of the “top 200” active economists at universities in the German speaking countries 
                                                 
** In discussing the origins of the recent economic crisis, Paul Krugman (2009) argues that “the economics 
profession went astray because economists, as a group, mistook beauty, clad in impressive-looking mathematics, 
for truth.” 
†† Liebowitz and Palmer (1984) who analyze the influence of economic journals state: “[E]conomists, being a 
rather narrow-minded and self-centered group, are probably more concerned with a journal’s impact on the 
economic profession [than on other disciplines].” 
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Germany, Austria and Switzerland. Furthermore, the newspaper published a list ranking the 
“top 100” researchers based on articles published in 2004 through 2008. 
 The Handelsblatt ranking is based on research output in 220 journals in the fields of 
economics and statistics. In weighting the journals, the Handelsblatt borrowed from two 
established European journal rankings, the ‘Tinbergen list’ and the weighting scheme 
developed by Combes and Linnemer (2003) (see section 2). Five top journals obtain the value 
1, the remaining journals obtain values between 0.67 and 0.2 points. A list with the journals 
and corresponding points is available on the internet‡‡. Short research notes and comments 
are counted half. Book reviews, replies and corrections are not counted. 
                                                
 The journal points received by the author of an article is calculated by the formula 
2p/(n+1), where p is the point value of the journal and n is the number of authors of the 
article. Points are summed over articles to obtain a researcher’s total score. The dataset relies 
on researcher-reported article lists. The article lists of all researchers (with journal points of 
each article) are published in the internet, such that misrepresentation is unlikely. 
 
3.2 Output measure based on citations 
 
For all authors listed in those Handelsblatt ranking lists, citation data were researched from 
the Web of Science database using the “search” and “cited reference search” tools. Where an 
author’s work could not be unambiguously identified by his or her last name and initial(s), we 
used his or her publication list to exclude articles from other authors. In the cases where we 
could proceed with the efficient “cited reference search” tool (since no or only few papers 
from other authors with identical name and initials had to be manually excluded), the citations 
numbers include also citations to articles that are not themselves listed in the Web of Science. 
In the remaining cases, where we used the “search” tool, the citations include only those to 
articles that are themselves referenced in the Web of Science. Due to resource constraints, and 
since the citations to non-Web of Science-listed publications are only a small fraction of the 
total, we chose to tolerate this (unsystematic) measurement error  
 
 
 
‡‡ http://www.handelsblatt.com/_t=dgtool,id=15,obj=1;singleclip (accessed 18 November, 2009). 
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4. Results 
 
4.1. Relationship between scores based on journals titles and number of citations 
 
Figure 1a shows scatter plots of the “top 200” researchers’ number of citations in 2008 and 
their lifetime scores (all articles) based on journal titles as published in the Handelsblatt 
ranking. Visual inspection suggests that the correlation between the two measures is relatively 
weak. Many of the “top” researchers in the Handelsblatt ranking are relatively rarely cited. 
On the other hand, there are some apparent “second rate” researchers whose work obtains 
relatively low scores but apparently makes a substantive impact on the literature. 
To quantify how much of the variation in citations can be explained by the 
Handelsblatt scores, the citation measure was regressed on the journal score to obtain the R2 
values (explained variation in the linear model) and the respective P-values (from testing the 
restriction that the coefficient on “journal score” is zero). The data were not log-transformed 
due to the occurrence of zero values in the citation variable. (The original data are available 
from the author on request.) 
Table 2 (upper part) summarizes these results. In the linear model, journal score 
explains 27 percent of the variation in citation rates. However, much of this explanatory 
power is due to a small number of top researchers. When the top 10 percent of researchers 
(based on Handelsblatt scores) are omitted, the percentage of explained variation drops to 5 
percent. When the top 20 percent are omitted, the proportion of explained variation drops to 3 
percent. These results show that the association between the Handelsblatt ranking and citation 
frequency is very weak. Evaluating research output based on the Handelsblatt ranking implies 
that relevance and innovation as measured by citations is almost completely discounted. 
One might object that lifetime journal scores may be only weakly correlated with 
citations, since older articles might not be cited any more in 2008 (although articles citing 
those articles might still be). To entertain this possibility, I also examined the relationship 
between journal scores accumulated in 2004 through 2008 and citations to articles published 
in 2004 through 2008 (Figure 1b). The finding is similar. The percentages of explained 
variation are even somewhat smaller, ranging from 11 percent for the full sample to 2 percent 
when the top 20 percent of researchers are omitted (Table 2, lower part). 
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4.2. Relationship between rank based on journals score and rank based on citations 
 
How do these numbers translate into researcher ranks? For illustrative purposes, I also plotted 
rank based on journal scores (Handelsblatt rank) against rank based on citations (Figure 2)§§. 
The Handelsblatt ranks based on lifetime journal score and 2008 citations to all articles are 
shown in Figure 2a. The data for the journal score of articles published in 2004 through 2008 
and the citations in 2008 to articles published in 2004 through 2008 are shown in Figure 2b. 
Again, the scatter plots shows that the Handelsblatt ranks are a very poor predictor of 
researcher ranks based on number of citations. 
 
 
5. Conclusion 
 
Article citations – the standard measure of research output in many disciplines – are 
increasingly questioned as a sole indicator of research quality. The present study argues that 
journal titles – the standard measure of research quality in economics – are even more 
problematic. The present empirical analysis shows that there is a lack of consistent 
relationship between the standard measure of research output and citations rates. This finding 
supports the hypothesis that the standard measure of research output in economics provides 
incentives for unfruitful research that is not (even) interesting and relevant to an academic 
audience. 
By their very nature, the standard measures based on journal titles not only fail to 
adequately measure the quality of an individual researcher’s work. More importantly, the 
measure introduces powerful incentives against interesting and relevant work. Since these 
standard measures do not reflect (multi-disciplinary) citation rates, they provide incentives for 
investing in unfruitful technical sophistication, academic followership, and disciplinary 
isolation which are rewarded by that standard. The financial crisis has most impressively 
demonstrated the failure of the economic discipline to respond to real world issues (e.g. 
Krugman 2009). Responsible universities and funding institutions are advised to re-consider 
existing practices in research evaluation and abandon the heavy reliance on journal titles in 
the evaluation of economic research. 
 
                                                 
§§ Where group of two or more researchers had received an identical number of citations, the ranks within the 
group were assigned based on journal scores. (Alternatively, one could assign equal ranks to these individuals 
without changing the overall pattern of the results.) 
8 
 References 
Adler, R, Ewing, J, Taylor, P. (Joint committee on Quantitative Assessment of Research). 
2008. Citation statistics. A report from the International Mathematical Union (IMU) in 
cooperation with the International Council of Industrial and Applied Mathematical 
Statistics (IMS). Corrected version, December 6, 2008. 
www.mathunion.org(fileadmin/IMU(Report/CitationStatistics.pdf (accessed 4 
January, 2009). 
Combes, P.P., Linnemer, L., 2003. Where are the economists who publish? Publication 
concentration and rankings in Europe based on cumulative publications. Journal of the 
European Economic Association 1(6),1250-1308. 
DFG (Deutsche Forschungsgemeinschaft) 2002. Perspektiven der Forschung und ihrer 
Förderung. Aufgaben und Finanzierung 2002-2006. Weinheim: Wiley-VCH. 
Kodrzycki, Y. K. and Yu, P. 2006. New approaches to ranking economics journals. BE Press 
Contributions to Economic Analysis & Policy 5(1), 1-42.  
Krugman, P. 2009. How did economists get it so wrong? New York Times Magazine, 2 
September, 2009. 
Laband, D. N. 2003. Dry holes in economic research. Kyklos 56(2), 161-174. 
Liebowitz, S. L. And Palmer, J.P., Assessing the relative impacts of economics journals. 
Journal of Economic Literature 22(1), 77-88. 
Frey, B. S., 2003. Publishing as prostitution? - Choosing between one's own ideas and 
academic success. Public Choice, 116(1-2), 205-223. 
Oswald, A. J. 2007. An examination of the reliability of prestigious scholarly journals: 
evidence and implications for decision-makers. Economica, 74, 21-31. 
Starbuck, W.H. 2005. How much better are the most-prestigious journals? The statistics of 
academic publication. Organization Science, 16(2), 180-200. 
9 
 Table 1. Problematic characteristics of output measures, resulting incentives, and relevance of 
the problem (+) for measures based on journal ratings and article citations. 
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Journal 
ratings 
Article 
citations 
Blind to relevance outside 
academia 
Incentive for irrelevant “ivory tower” 
research 
+ + 
Reward for “fashionable” 
topics (in review stage or 
after publication) 
Incentive for publication of 
superficially interesting results, herd 
behaviour 
+ + 
Measurement at group 
(journal) rather than 
individual (article) level  
Incentive for wasteful investments in 
repeated submissions to top journals 
with high rejection rates 
+  
Quality appraisal only 
during review process 
Incentive for “pleasing” rather than 
innovative research 
+  
Inappropriate reward for 
technicality/sophistication 
Incentive for wasteful investments in 
technical sophistication 
+  
Exclusion of work in other 
disciplines 
Disincentive for collaboration with 
other disciplines 
+  
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 Table 2. Proportion of variation in citations explained by journal scores (R2-values and P-
values from linear regression models). 
Sample n R2 P-value 
All articles    
   Full sample 200 0.27 <0.001 
   Top 10 percent of scores omitted 180 0.05 0.002 
   Top 20 percent of scores omitted 160 0.03 0.039 
Articles in 2004-2008    
   Full sample 100 0.11 <0.001 
   Top 10 percent of scores omitted   90 0.07 0.014 
   Top 20 percent of scores omitted   80 0.02 0.163 
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Figure legends 
 
Figure 1. Relationship between journal score and citations in 2008: a) total journal score 
and citations to all articles; b) journal score in 2004-2008 and citations to 
articles published in 2004-2008. 
 
Figure 2. Relationship between researcher rank based on journal titles and researcher 
rank based on citations: a) ranks based on total journal score and citations to all 
articles; b) ranks based on journal score in 2004-2008 and citations to articles 
published in 2004-2008. 
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